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Abstract
The notion of flexicurity promotes the idea of compensation of labour market deregulation
(= flexibilization) with advantages in employment and social security. To monitor effects
of flexicurity policies in Europe, flexicurity indices are constructed from (a) scores of the
strictness of employment protection legislation provided by the OECD, (b) qualitative ju-
ridical data on social security benefits (unemployment insurance, public pensions, etc.), and
(c) data on the dynamics of employment types (permanent, temporary, full-time, part-time,
self-employed, etc.). The empirical investigation shows that, contrary to political promises
and theoretical opinions, the current deregulation of European labour markets is not com-
pensated with improvements in social security.
Keywords: Flexicurity, employment security, social security, employment protection legis-
lation, statistical indices.
JEL Classification: C43 — Index Numbers and Aggregation, C51 — Model Construc-
tion and Estimation, J21 — Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure, J26 —
Retirement; Retirement Policies, J65 — Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant
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1 Introduction: Economical and social background
Measure what is measurable, and make measurable what is not so.
Galileo (1564–1642)
The general employment insecurity has significantly increased in Europe during the last 20
years. In addition to unemployment, the number of atypically employed, like part-time,
fixed-term, or self-employed, has disproportionately grown since the 1980s (EuroStat 2003).
The atypical employment is not only less secure but also provides less carrier prospects
and training chances (OECD 2002, p. 156–159). Besides, it often disqualifies workers from
social benefits, since the eligibility of atypically employed is substantially lower than that of
permanently employed (OECD 2002, p. 131). The growth of atypical employment can be
explained by several factors.
1. Globalization. Investments under globalization are easily made worldwide, industries
and services move from one country to another, making permanent employment restric-
tive for efficient economic performance. The collapse of the Socialist Block gave way
to unconstrained capitalism. The market economy became total, imposing economic
priorities over social ones.
To improve the competitiveness of firms in the background of exporting industries to
countries with cheap labour, European employers required the liberalization of na-
tional economies; for the deregulation of labour markets see Esping-Andersen and
Regini (2000). Some governments yielded their pressure and the employment protec-
tion legislation (EPL) became more relaxed, resulting in a number of negative effects
on labour markets and social structures (OECD 1999, section 2).
2. Rapid technological changes. Expanding information technologies are often im-
plemented within relatively short-time projects. Some projects are realized by small
temporary teams with a limited longevity and even by single individuals. These par-
ticularities and dynamics are transmitted to all branches which use information tech-
nologies and depend on their updates. Thus, the share of temporary employment in
the total employment in France, Italy, Netherlands, and Spain doubled or tripled dur-
ing 1985–2000, attaining in Spain 35% (OECD 2002, p. 133). The annual growth of
self-employment in the non-agricultural sector in the OECD countries in 1990–1998
was 1.7%, whereas that of civilian employment 1% (OECD 2000, p. 159).
3. Long-term unemployment. During the 1990s the long-term unemployment in the
OECD countries has become a more serious problem then before. In 1990 the un-
employed for 6–12 months and for more than 12 months constituted respectively 44.6
and 30.9% of all unemployed. In 1998 these figures attained 48.6 and 33.4% (OECD
2002, p. 322). This means that the average duration of unemployment together with
the share of long-term unemployment in the total unemployment has increased. This
structural change indicates at an unusual social process. Its consequence is that the
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workers having experienced a long-time unemployment “are more likely to be offered
shorter contracts than other workers” (OECD 2002, p. 156).
4. Immigration. As stated by the OECD (2001, p. 171), “While admissions of new
permanent foreign workers are currently very few in number, especially in the European
OECD countries, the temporary employment of foreigners appear to be becoming more
widespread. . . . The temporary employment of foreign workers introduces flexibility
into the labour market.” Moreover, foreigners are overrepresented among long-term
unemployed (OECD 2001, p. 181–182) whose chances to get a ‘normal’ permanent job
are relatively low (OECD 2002, p. 156).
5. High welfare. Finally, high earnings and accumulated welfare in some European
countries enabled a fraction of the population to turn to part-time jobs. For instance,
the demand for part-time employment by full-time employed in the Netherlands is
twice as large than vice versa. For women this ratio is even higher and surpasses 3 : 1
(OECD 1999, p. 33).
The growth of atypical employment (= other than permanent full-time) and intensive
labour market transitions (Schmid and Gazier 2002) result in a new social situation which
should be adequately reflected in the public policy. In most of the post-war Europe, employ-
ment relations were regulated by rather constraining employment protection legislation and
by collective agreements between employers and trade unions. The actual contradiction be-
tween the flexibilization pursued by employers and strict labour market regulation defended
by trade unions makes topical the discussion on flexibilization and employment protection
legislation with regard to economical performance and unemployment.
The advantages and disadvantages of labour market regulation/flexibility versus employ-
ment were investigated by numerous scholars; for a review focusing on European welfare
states as defined by Esping-Andersen (1990) see Esping-Andersen (2000a–b). As concluded
by Esping-Andersen (2000b, p. 99), ‘the link between labour market regulation and employ-
ment is hard to pin down’. The same empirical evidence, that unemployment is practically
independent of the strictness of employment protection legislation, was reported by the
OECD (1999, pp. 47–132). There were even cases when the same legislative changes caused
different effects. For instance, the impact of almost equal deregulation measures on the use
of fixed-term contracts ‘was sharply different’ in Germany and Spain (OECD, 1999, p. 71).
At the same time, a good labour market performance under little regulation was inher-
ent in the ‘Anglo-Saxon model’, that is, USA, Canada, United Kingdom, and Australia
(Esping-Andrsen 2000a). The deregulation of labour market in the Netherlands, which had
a different kind of economy, coincided with the ‘Dutch miracle’ of the 1990s (Visser and
Hemerijck 1997, Gorter 2000, van Oorschot 2000). A similar Danish practice in the back-
ground of ‘Eurosclerosis’ (Esping-Andersen 2000a, p. 67) was successfull as well (Bjo¨rklund
2000, Braun 2001, Madsen 2004). All of these convinced some scholars and politicians of the
harmlessness and even usefulness of labour market deregulation. It was believed that em-
ployment flexibility improved competitiveness of firms and thereby stimulated production,
which in turn stimulated labour markets.
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The claims for flexibilization met a hard resistance, especially in countries with old tra-
ditions of struggle for labour rights. Wilthagen and Tros (2004, p. 179) reported with a
reference to Korver (2001) that the Green Paper: Partnership for a New Organisation of
Work of the European Commission (1997) ‘which promoted the idea of social partnership
and balancing flexibility and security’ got a very negative response from French and German
trade unions, because ‘the idea of partnership represents a threat to the independence of
unions and a denail of the importance of worker’s rights and positions, notably at the enter-
prise level’. The ILO published a report, concluding that ‘the flexibilization of the labour
market has led to a significant erosion of worker’s rights in fundamentally important areas
which concern their employment and income security and (relative) stability of their working
and living conditions’ (Ozaki 1999, p. 116).
To handle the growing flexibility of employment relations with lower job security and de-
creasing eligibility to social benefits, the notion of flexicurity has been introduced. Wilthagen
and Tros (2004) ascribe its conception to a member of the Dutch Scientific Council of Gov-
ernment Policy, Professor Hans Adriaansens, and the Dutch Minister of Social Affairs, Ad
Melkert (Labour Party). In the autumn of 1995 Adriaansens launched this catchy word in
speeches and interviews, having defined it as a shift from job security towards employment
security. He suggested to compensate the decreasing job security due to fewer permanent
jobs and easier dismissals by improving employment opportunities and social security.
For instance, a relaxation of the employment protection legislation was supposed to be
counterbalanced by providing improvements to temporary and part-time workers, supporting
life-long professional training which facilitates changes of jobs, more favorable regulation
of working time, and additional social benefits. In December 1995 Ad Melkert presented
a memorandum Flexibility and Security, on the relaxation of the employment protection
legislation of permanent workers, provided that temporary workers got regular employment
status, without however adopting the concept of flexicurity as such. By the end of 1997 the
Dutch parliament accepted flexibility/security proposals and shaped them into laws which
came in force in 1999.
The OECD (2004, p. 97–98) ascribes the flexicurity to Denmark with its traditionally
weak employment protection, highly developed social security, and easiness to find a job,
see also Madsen (2004). Regardless of the priority in inventing the word flexicurity, both
countries were recognized “good-practice examples” (Braun 2001, van Oorschot 2001) and
inspired the international flexicurity debate. Although some authors still consider flexicurity
a specific Dutch/Danish phenomenon (Gorter 2000), the idea spread all over Europe in a few
years; for a selection of recent international contributions see Jepsen and Klammer (2004).
At the Lisbon summit of 2000 the EU had already referred to this concept (Vielle and
Walthery 2003, p. 2; Keller and Seifert 2004, p. 227).
Since the concept is rather new, there is neither an established definition of flexicurity,
nor means for its quantitative characterization. This study attempts to operationally define
flexicurity, reflecting viewpoints of neoliberals and trade unions. The flexicurity indices for
16 European countries for the years 1990–2003 are derived from (a) scores of employment
protection legislation provided by the OECD (1999, pp. 52–53 and 2004, pp. 61–125), (b)
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qualitative juridical data on five social security benefits (unemployment insurance, public
pensions, sick leave, maternity/parental leave, and paid holidays) available from the OECD
(2002, p. 144–150) and European Commission (2004), and (c) data on the dynamics of em-
ployment types (permanent, temporary, full-time, part-time, self-employed, etc.) available
from EuroStat (2004). The factual rather than purely legislative situation is reflected by
taking into account the variable size of employment groups with different eligibility to social
security benefits.
The results are not encouraging. Contrary to theoretical opinions and political promises,
the current deregulation of European labour markets is not adequately compensated by
improvements in social security. After the flexicurity advanages/disadvantages have been
accounted proportionally to the size of the affected groups, the factual trends turn out to
be negative even from the viewpoint of neoliberals, to say nothing of trade unions. The
reciprocity between the advantages/disadvantages is illusory, because gains are smaller than
losses and winners are fewer than losers. Thus the study warns against promoting flexicurity
policies with no operational control and empirical feedback. To surmount the negative
trends, some improvements of flexicurity policies are suggested to meet the requirements of
trade unions.
2 Flexicurity policies as flexibility versus security trade-
offs
The comprehensive 758-page report on flexicurity (Klammer and Tillmann 2001, p. 16)
refers to the definition of Wilthagen (2001, p. 1). The definition remained actual and was
used three years later by Wilthagen and Tros (2004, p. 169). The only modification is the
substitution of the word ‘deliberate’ for the former ‘coordinated’:
Definition 1 [Flexicurity is] a policy strategy that attempts, synchronically and in a deliber-
ate way, to enhance the flexibility of labour markets, work organization and labour relations
on the one hand, and to enhance security — employment security and social security —
notably for weak groups in and outside the labour market on the other hand.
Wilthagen and Tros (2004, p. 170) emphasize that flexicurity is not ‘simply social pro-
tection for flexible work forces as Klammer and Tillmann (2001), Ferrera et al (2001) and
many others tend to analyze it’. According to Wilthagen and Tros (2004, p. 167), flexicu-
rity policies aim at increasing the competitiveness of European economies by their further
liberalization:
. . . The mission of the EU as formulated in Lisbon in 2000 clearly reflects the
ambition of enhancing both flexibility and security as the aims ‘to become the
most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable
of sustainable economic growth’. . .
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Therefore, ‘enhancing security’ is not the primary goal. It is rather a means to attain
a compromise between employers, who seek for the deregulation of labour markets, and
employees, who wish to protect their rights. It explicitly manifests itself in the description
of flexicurity as a flexibility versus security trade-off; see Visser and Hemerijck (1997, p. 44)
and Wilthagen and Tros (2004, p. 171). Let us consider notions Flexibility and Security in
some detail to better understand which trade is proposed.
Flexibility versus security The Flexibility stands for a multivariate aggregate which,
according to the OECD (1989, p. 13–20), includes:
1. External numerical flexibility (employment flexibility by Standing 1999, p. 101–114;
numerical flexibility by Regini 2000, p. 16, external quantitative flexibility by Vielle
and Walthery 2003, p.8) defined as the employer’s ability to adjust the number of
employees to current needs. In other words, it is the ease of ‘hiring and firing’ which
manifests itself in the mobility of workers between employers (external job turnover).
2. Internal numerical flexibility (work process or functional flexibility by Standing 1999,
p. 114–116; temporal flexibility by Regini 2000, p. 17, internal quantitative flexibility by
Vielle and Walthery 2003, p.8) which is the employer’s ability to modify the number
and distribution of working hours with no change of the number of employees. It
appears in shiftworking, seasonal changes in the demand for labour, weekend/holiday
working, overtime and variable hours, see also Keller and Seifert (2004, p. 228).
3. Functional flexibility (job structure flexibility by Standing 1999, p. 117–124; internal-
functional flexibility by Keller and Seifert 2004, p. 228, internal qualitative flexibility by
Vielle and Walthery 2003, p. 8), that is, the employers’ ability to move their employees
from one task or department to another, or to change the content of their work. It is
reflected by the mobility of workers within enterprises (internal labour turnover), see
also Regini (2000, p. 16).
4. Wage flexibility (flexible or variable pay by Wilthagen and Tros 2004, p. 171), which
enables employers to alter wages in response to changing labour market or competitive
conditions. Typically, employers seek for applying individual performance-linked re-
warding systems additionally to (or instead of) usual collective agreements independent
of individual performance, see also Regini (2000, p. 16–17, 19–21).
5. Externalization flexibility (external functional flexibility by Keller and Seifert 2004, p.
228; one of constituents of job structure flexibility by Standing 1999, p. 123; external
qualitative flexibility by Vielle and Walthery 2003, p.8), that is, the employers’ ability
to order some works from external workers or firms without employment contracts
but with commercial contracts in such forms as distance working, teleworking, virtual
organizations, and entreployees, that is, self-entrepreneurial activities, see Pongratz
and Voß (2003).
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The notion of Security also includes several issues. For instance, Standing (1999, p. 52)
enumerates seven types of security. They are not all relevant to the flexicurity debate,
like labour market security through state-guaranteed full employment in socialist countries.
Within the debate Vielle and Walthery (2003, p. 18–19), following Dupeyroux and Ruellan
(1998), focus the attention at compensatory functions of securities in case of unemployment,
illness, advancing age, maternity, invalidity, as well as exceptional medical or family burdens
(decommodification in the sense of Esping-Andersen (1990)). More specifically, Wilthagen,
Tros and van Lieshout (2003, p. 4) restrict consideration to the following four types of
security:
1. Job security (employment security by Standing (1999, p. 52)), ‘the certainty of retaining
a specific job with a specific employer’ . It is guaranteed by the protection of employees
against dismissals and against significant changes of working conditions. This is the
main subject of the employment protection legislation.
2. Employment/employability security (job security by Standing (1999, p. 52)), the ‘cer-
tainty of remaining at work (not necessarily with the same employer)’. It means the
availability of jobs for dismissed and unemployed, corresponding to their qualification
and previous working conditions. The employability of job seekers can be improved by
life-long professional training which can be offered both by employers and by training
programs within active labour market policies; see Keller and Seifert (2004, p. 235).
Tros (2004, p. 5) also mentions entreployees, organization of firm-firm job pools, and
facilities for work-work transitions.
3. Income (social) security, the ‘income protection in the event that paid work ceases’.
Standing considers it more generally as protection of income through minimum wage
machinery, wage indexation, comprehensive social security, including progressive tax-
ation, provisions for old age (post-employment security by Keller and Seifert 2004, p.
236–238), etc.
4. Combination security (not considered by other authors cited), ‘the certainty of being
able to combine paid work with other social responsibilities and obligations. This last
form of security cannot be traced back to the other forms of security.’ Tros (2004, p. 5)
explains it further as a work-life balance, work-family balance, early flexible part-time
retirement, flexible working hours, and leave facilities.
Thus, a flexicurity policy is imagined as an increase in the four types of Flexibility com-
pensated by improvements in five types of Security.
3 Problems in tracing flexicurity polices with matrices
Matrices like in Table 1 are often suggested ‘as a heuristic tool to trace flexicurity poli-
cies as specific trade-offs’ (Wilthagen and Tros 2004, p. 171). Table 1 is taken from Tros’
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Table 1: The matrix aimed at tracing flexibility versus security trade-offs with a flexicurity
policy for older workers as given by Tros (2004)
Flexibility types Security types
Job security Employment security Income security Combination security
External numerical Firm-firm job pools
Facilities work-work
transitions
Older
entreployees
Retirement
arrangements
Internal numerical Part-time work
Flexible
retirement
Part-time entreploy-
ees
Flexible
retirement
Part-time
retirement
Flexible age
(pre)pension
Flexible working
hours
Leave-facilities
Functional Education/training
Adaptation in work-
ing hours/tasks
Education/training
Seniority/bridge
jobs
Job-rotation
Age-aware career
and job structures
Table 2: The Dutch Law on Flexibility and Security (extraction) from January 1, 1999, as
given by Wilthagen and Tros (2004), which cannot be inscribed into Table 1
Flexibility Security
• Adjustment of the regula-
tion of fixed-term employ-
ment contracts: after 3 con-
secutive contracts or when
the total length of consecu-
tive contracts totals 3 years
or more, a permanent con-
tract exists (previously this
applied to fixed-term con-
tracts that had been ex-
tended once).
• The obligation of temporary
work agencies (TWA) to be
in possession of a permit
has been withdrawn. The
maximum term for this type
of employment (formerly 6
months) is abolished as well.
• The notice period is in prin-
ciple 1 month and 4 months
at maximum (used to be 6
months).
• Introduction of so-called presumptions of law which
strengthen the position of atypical workers (regard-
ing the existence of an employment contract and the
number of working hours agreed in that contract);
the existence of an employment contract is more eas-
ily presumed.
• A minimum entitlement to three hours’ pay for on-
call workers each time they are called in to work.
• Regulation of the risk of non-payment of wages in
the event of there being no work for an on-call
worker: the period over which employers may claim
that they need not pay wages for hours not worked
has been reduced to six months.
• A worker’s contract with a TWA is considered a reg-
ular employment contract; only in the first 26 weeks
are the agency and the agency worker allowed a cer-
tain degree of freedom with respect to starting and
ending the employment relationship.
• Special dismissal protection has been introduced for
employees engaged in trade union activities.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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(2004) paper on flexicurity policies for old-aged workers. The cells of the table show policy
measures relevant to the intersecting types of flexibility and security. Some measures are
multi-relevant, like entreployees, appearing at several row/column intersections. Such tables
well illustrate the compound structure of Flexibility and Security but at a closer look fail to
describe flexicurity trade-offs.
No fit of actual policy measures to the table cells One bottle-neck is that Table 1
provides no space for locating deregulation-only measures or purely security innovations.
In particular, the Dutch Law on Flexibility and Security summarized in Table 2 cannot
be inscribed into Table 1. Indeed, the Dutch Law consists of a number of items, each
contributing either to flexibility, or to security. The cells of Table 1, on the contrary, combine
certain types of flexibility and security simultaneously. Therefore, no item of the Dutch Law
fits to any cell of the table.
Aiming at classification rather than at compensation issues Besides, Table 1 is
aimed at classifying policy measures into flexibility/security types instead of measuring their
contribution to flexibility/security required for tracing trade-offs. For instance, trading boats
for cars requires an exchange rate expressed in some units, even if conditional, and the same
is required for tracing flexibility/security trade-offs. In a sense, Table 1 only suggests which
types of boats are exchanged for which types of cars with no further specificity. Moreover,
the simultaneous classification into flexibility and security types makes policy measures am-
biguous (in favor of flexibility or rather security?) which, concealing the compensation issues,
creates an illusion of a ‘deliberate’ solution.
For instance, consider Firm-firm job pools at the intersection of row External numerical
flexibility and column Employment security. If it is a flexibility measure to ‘softly’ dismiss
workers (it stands in the row External numerical flexibility !) then the equivalent social
compensation should be specified. If it is a security measure against easy dismissals (it
stands in the column Employment security !) then it is too weak because it provides poorer
career opportunities than retaining the same job. If it is thought to combine both flexibility
and security in a ‘deliberate’ rate then it is too vague to be taken seriously.
The column Income security is even less clear. What can Retirement arrangements in
the row External numerical flexibility mean? That a dismissed worker will retire? And
additionally will get a pension equivalent to the wage? What can Flexible retirement in the
row Internal numerical flexibility mean? That a non-benevolent part-timer gets additionally
a compensatory part-time retirement? In which rate then?
Insufficient dimensionality The third reason why the matrix in Table 1 is little ap-
propriate for tracing flexicurity trade-offs is its insufficient 2D-dimensionality to represent
all the information required. It only provides the information on (a) what the measure,
(b) its simultaneous relevance to one type of Flexibility and to one type of Security, with-
out estimating the effective contributions to Flexibility and/or Security. The relevance and
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contributions to several flexibility/security types, which is typical in actuality, cannot be re-
flected. To surmount this shortage, one has to describe a policy measure by a 9-dimensional
vector
Policy measure ↔ (∆x1, . . . ,∆x5︸ ︷︷ ︸
increments
in 5 types of
flexibility
= vector ∆X
,∆y1, . . . ,∆y4︸ ︷︷ ︸
increments
in 4 types of
security
= vector ∆Y
) .
For example, deregulation-only and security-only measures are described by 9-dimensional
vectors (∆x1, . . . ,∆x5, 0, . . . , 0) and (0, . . . , 0,∆y1, . . . ,∆y4), respectively, and a policy mea-
sure which enhances the first type of flexibility is represented by vector (∆x1, 0, . . . , 0).
If quantifying contributions to the nine flexibility/security types is difficult then at least
the verbal 9-dimensional format should be respected: (a) What the policy measure, (b)
Which contributions to the five flexibility types, and (c) Which contributions to the four
security types.
Double functionality of factors and reduction of their number Let us see, whether
the dimensionality of flexicurity policies is indeed that high, or can be lowered down. Note
that the security factors, except Income (social) security, are the flexibility factors regarded
from the security viewpoint and ‘securitively’ labelled.
Job security is just the inverse of the External numerical flexibility. It decreases propor-
tionally to the growth of External numerical flexibility, and vice versa. Therefore, consider-
ing Job security within Security instead of Flexibility means accounting debts for credits. It
should be accounted once, and actually within the increasing Flexibility.
Employment security is closely interrelated with Internal numerical and Functional flexi-
bility. Variable tasks, training, and using variable hours are attributes of internal numerical
and functional flexibility. Employees are compelled to meet the increasing requirements of
employers under the increasing risk of unemployment. At the same time, these measures are
presented as employment security measures, because without these measures the employer
will more likely look for new personnel, which means an increasing risk of dismissals. Thus,
the Employment security in the given form is but the inverse of two kinds of Flexibility.
The Combination security is a ‘positively-minded’ reformulation of negative consequences
of three types of flexibility (External numerical, Internal numerical, and Externalization).
For instance, entreployees, flexible working hours, part-time work, and early retirement are
all on the flexibility agenda. Having been reformulated as combination security measures,
they look as consolations for non-benevolently self-employed, flexible-hours workers, part-
timers, or early retired. Indeed, every cloud has a silver lining.
For the Wage flexibility, there is no security measure even for consolation.
In sum, the Security against Flexibility looks thin rather than full-valued. It has little
sense to oppose all types of security to flexibility, because the latter implies most of the
former. With minor reservations, the real room for tracing trade-offs contains five
flexibility sub-indices against one security index Income (social) security.
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Roughly speaking, the situation is reduced to money compensations to workers who suffer
from flexibilization. It is exactly the axis of bargaining between employers and trade unions
which struggle for guaranteed jobs and stable wages instead of accepting inequivalent social
security benefits.
4 Monitoring flexicurity policies in a vector space
Restrict attention to two main factors of flexicurity, Strictness of employment protection
legislation (EPL) and Social (income) security represented quantitatively. Recall that the
flexicurity debate originates from claims to relax the EPL which constrains the external
numerical flexibility. Consequently, the Strictness of EPL can be regarded as an indicator of
the External numerical flexibility which plays the key role in the debate. As for the latter
factor, its prime importance is explained in the last paragraph of the previous section.
Thus our consideration is reduced to one Flexibility and one Security dimension. Recall
that in a two-commodity space, a trade-off is an indifference curve along which a decrease in
one commodity is compensated by an increase in another commodity. Our case is shown in
Figure 1. The frontal horizontal axis Strictness of EPL displays the strictness of employment
protection legislation measured in some conditional %. The strictness grows from left to
right, implying flexibility at the left hand and rigidity at the right hand:
Flexibility = 100%− Strictness of EPL .
The second axis Security shows the aggregated employment and social security also measured
in some conditional %. States of the society are depicted by points (vectors) in the two-
dimensional plane Flexibility–Security.
To speak of a trade-off, one has to assume a social preference. A preference is usually
represented by a utility function which takes greater values at more preferable points and
remains constant at equivalent points joined into indifference curves (= trade-offs). The
indifference curves are but points of the same height on the utility hill; see Figure 1. A
flexicurity policy is imagined as a motion along one of such indifference curves towards a
higher flexibility, while the loss in the employment protection being compensated by a gain
in the social security.
Suppose that the Netherlands in 1995 are characterized by a flexibility-security vector
1995 ↔ (EPL1995, S1995) .
If the Dutch Law’99 in Table 2 decreases the Strictness of EPL by ∆EPL and increases
Security by ∆S, then the state in 2000 corresponds to vector
2000 ↔ (EPL1995 − ∆EPL︸ ︷︷ ︸
decrement
in the
strictness
of EPL
due to the
Dutch Law’99
, S1995 + ∆S︸︷︷︸
increment
in social
security
due to the
Dutch Law’99
) = (EPL2000, S2000) .
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Figure 1: A flexicurity policy along a tradeoff ‘Flexibility versus security’
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If the flexicurity policy is implemented correctly then vector 2000 lies in the indifference curve
through 1995 as in Figure 1. If vector 2000 lied in the red Pareto-worsening domain (more
flexibility under no improvement in security) then it would mean that a deregulation-only
policy takes place.
5 Chart of flexicurity policies for European countries
To monitor flexicurity policies in a vector space we use composite indicators of social security
(Annex 1–2) and of strictness of EPL; the latter being based on the ones constructed by the
OECD (1999, 2004) for permanently and temporarily employed; see Annex 3.
Figure 2 displays dynamical trajectories of European countries in the plane Flexibility–
Security. The simplest flexicurity utility function u =(Strictness of EPL+Security)/2 is
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shown by diagonal indifference lines.
The flexicure countries with a high flexibility and a high security are located in the
top-left corner (Denmark and Finland). The inflexicure countries with a low flexibility (=
high Strictness of EPL) and a high index of Security are located in the top-right corner
of the chart (Sweden and the Netherlands). The only outlier in the left-bottom corner
with high flexibility and low social security indicator is the flex-insecure United Kingdom.
The bottom-right corner is occupied by inflex-insecure countries with a strict employment
protection legislation and relatively little advanced social security (Spain, Portugal, and
Czech Republic).
The pursuing a flexicurity policy means the direction of a country’s trajectory towards
the ‘North-West’. It is inherent in Denmark in the 1990s and the Netherlands in the late
1990s, when the flexicurity debate was initiated. Since the exact slope of indifference curves
is not known, it is unclear whether the flexibility-security compensation was ‘deliberate’, but
at least a flexicurity development cannot be denied.
All directions between ‘West’ and ‘South’ correspond to Pareto-worsening for all imag-
inable social utility functions (no improvement in both factors—no compensation comes in
question). Since, with the only short-time exceptions for Denmark and Netherlands, all
trajectories are directed towards ‘South’, ‘South-West’, or ‘West’, the deregulation-only
policies are unambiguously prevailing, whereas the much promoted flexicurity is
practically invisible.
No increase in the Security index is observed in all the countries with the only exception
for the Netherlands in the late 1990s. It does not necessarily imply that there are no
improvements in national social security systems all over Europe. The explanation is that
an increase in flexible employment disqualifies workers from social benefits. Recall that
the indices Flexibility and Security are weighted, reflecting the average factual situation in
the country. Flexibilization lowers down the average employment status and, also on the
average, disqualifies workers from social benefits, thereby lowering down the factual security.
Consequently, even a developing social security system can fail in increasing the Security
index if the flexibilization is followed with a delay and if eligibility conditions are fitted to
outdated norms.
The impact of flexibilization on the factual state of security is observed in Germany,
where a relaxation of EPL since 1991 caused a reduction of the share of normal employment
71 ↘ 62%; see Table 8 and coupled Figure 5. Since fewer employed got qualified for high
security benefits, the factual security decreased by 1%. Thus an increase in Flexibility was
aggravated by an implicit decrease in Security, by the principle ‘who does not swim drowns’.
(A similar relaxation of EPL in Spain did not cause structural changes in employment as in
Germany, because the share of normally employed in Spain was already as low as 50% and
did not decrease further; for exact data and their derivatives see country tables and figures
in Tangian (2004b) which are not replicated here).
Some countries develop their social security systems but manage only to ‘run in place’
against the counter-flow of flexibilization. For instance, the improvement in Portugal’s social
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Figure 2: Flexibility-Security trajectories in the background of diagonal flexicurity isolines
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security since 1992 was annihilated by a reduction of the share of normal employment from
65% to 56%, and the Security index remained unchanged; see Tangian (2004b). Thus, secu-
rity measures intended to compensate a growing flexibilization can suffice only to retain the
existing security level but not to pursue a flexicurity policy. To be a real balance weight
for flexibilization, the security system must be itself flexible and double-generous
with increasing compensatory capacities and relaxing eligibility conditions.
6 Trade-unionist view at flexicurity
According to the viewpoint so long discussed, the relaxation of the EPL required by employ-
ers can be equivalently compensated by better social security benefits to workers. Flexicurity
is thereby a particular manifestation of social compromise, discussed since Rousseau’s (1762)
Social Contract.
From the viewpoint of trade unions, first of all French and German, flexibilization of
employment relations can be hardly compensated by social security benefits, and giving up
labour rights for social advantages is not appropriate. Even if each particular compromise
seems more or less fair, their succession can lead away from the social status quo and the
employees can finally get nothing or very little for their pains. It can run as in the known
tale about a man who goes to the market with a horse, exchanges it for a cow, then the cow
for a sheep, and so on until he finds himself with nothing but a needle which he looses on
the way home.
Who is interested in flexicurity? Since changes in the EPL are required by employers,
the compromise tends to meet their interests first, although Wilthagen and Tros (2004)
argue for ’win-win strategies’ (p. 173) in ’positive sum games’ (p. 179). However, trade
unions argue that even if prosperous enterprises offer additional benefits to workers, the
general profit distribution is unlikely to be fair, taking into account the increasing income
difference between workers and owners with top managers.
A flexicurity trade-off is a chain of compromises, meaning that flexibility and security are
opposed to each other. Since a relaxation of the employment protection legislation requires a
compensation, flexibilization is implicitly recognized as being ‘socially bad’ (otherwise what
is the compensation for?). Therefore, the question emerges: If flexibilization is ‘socially
bad’, why not abolish it? Why not move along the same indifference curve in the opposite
direction, towards a stricter employment protection legislation accompanied by a reduction
of social security? At least, it could release considerable social security funds with no loss
in the social utility.
Since this possibility is not discussed, there should be some motivation exclusively for
flexibilization. Since a flexicurity policy along a trade-off results in no increment in social
utility, the motivation is beyond the social preference. In other words, someone ‘beyond
the society’ wins from flexibilization while the society itself gets no advantages. Therefore,
the understanding of flexicurity as a trade-off cannot be a ‘win–win strategy’. At best it
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is a ‘win—no-win-no-loss’ policy with a ‘positive sum’ but not for the society, and not for
workers.
Obviously, every step towards a higher flexibility always meets interests of employers
regardless of the state of social security. Business gets rid of restrictions, managers improve
performance by rotating personnel, and firms gain higher profits. All expenses are recovered
by the state which arranges everything: paves the way for a favorable public opinion, accepts
new laws, and provides compensations to workers in the form of additional social security
benefits. One can argue that employers, having got advantages, gain higher profits, pay more
taxes, and thereby refill governmental funds. It is however unlikely that all the additional
tax-returns will be channelled to social security but not to other purposes and that firms’
share in this financial loop will be modest enough to be socially fair. Therefore, such a
flexibilization scenario leads not only to a liberalization of the economy but also turns out to
be a long-running indirect governmental donation to firms. Since the state budget originates
from taxpayers, the employees are the ones contributing to the donation.
Which are the doubts? Trade unions put in question the main argument of adherents
of flexicurity as a trade-off, that higher social guarantees can compensate a higher risk to
loose a job. The train of thought which disproves the argument is as follows. Assume that
an increase in the risk to loose a job can be compensated by a sufficiently high increase in
guaranteed social benefits, that is, in income and status. Then one arrives inductively step-
by-step to the extreme case, when the growing risk to loose the job turns into certainty, while
the social compensation remains adequate. It means that for (almost) every employee the
loss of his/her employment can be adequately compensated by social security in income and
status. Then very few individuals will be motivated to work, and the resulting low production
will not cover high expenditures for social security. This economical contradiction shows that
every relaxation of EPL can be compensated by social security benefits only partially but
never completely.
Even if it were possible to more or less adequately compensate a relaxation in the strictness
of EPL with social security advantages, entrusting the workers’ welfare to the welfare-giver,
the state, would be too risky. Indeed, every political change or economic recession may
result in easily realizable social cuts (as now in Germany). Employment protection, on the
contrary, guarantees jobs and, consequently, a stable income even during recessions and
political crises (Bewley 1999).
The next point is that non-benevolently changing jobs destroys career prospects. Since
past achievements play a little role, each time one must begin from the start and establish
oneself anew. Since the acquired experience can be insufficient, it is often necessary to
learn new skills and to accommodate to the new environment. Besides, one can be obliged
to move from one place to another which complicates the family life. All of these can be
psychologically difficult, time-consuming, and little successful, especially at an older age.
Finally, it is often emphasized that the flexicurity as a trade-off is advantageous for social
beneficiaries. For employees it turns out that the already incomplete social security compen-
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sation for their labour rights is further reduced in favor of ‘weaker groups’ (otherwise, where
to take resources from? In fact, all money paid to anybody is subtracted from somebody).
Moreover, the compensation for employees in the form of social security looks as a charity
rather than as a reward for their contribution to the national economy. This ethical nuance
damages the civil image of employees, equalizing them to non-employed.
Trade-unionist understanding of the role of flexicurity The specificity of the trade-
unionist viewpoint at flexicurity is reflected by the alternative definition below. It is just the
one criticized by Wilthagen and Tros (2004, p. 170):
Definition 2 (trade-unionist) [Flexicurity is] social protection for flexible work forces,
understood as ‘an alternative to pure flexibilization’ (Keller and Seifert 2004, p. 226), and
‘to a deregulation-only policy’ (Klammer 2004, p. 283); see also WSI (2000).
Thus, the main distinction of the trade-unionist understanding of flexicurity is that it
should protect employees’ positions in the globalization-driven processes, as opposed to ne-
oliberal suggestions to meet employer’s requirements under new economical conditions. In
other words, trade-unions consider flexicurity an instrument of labour movement with a ref-
erence to the status-quo, whereas neoliberals narrow it down to a form of bargaining with
relativized values (Cf. with Wilthagen and Tros’ (2004, p. 170) ‘weaker groups in and outside
the labour market . . . [where] . . . the classifications ‘stronger’ or ‘weaker’ only have a relative
meaning here and cannot be defined in advance’).
Trade-unionist social utility function Since trade unions see little possibilities to com-
pensate flexibilization of employment relations with improved social security benefits, the
preference of trade unions is determined primarily by the strictness of EPL, and the second
factor, security, is considered ceteris paribus, if only the first factor remains invariable. It
means that for every given strictness of EPL the preference grows from 0% to 100%-security
level; and every such a run is superior to any run which starts from a lower strictness level of
EPL; see Figure 3. The preference can be imagined as a staircase with floors being the EPL
strictness levels and each flight of stairs being the full-range ascent along the social security
scale.
This type of preference is called lexicographic by analogy with a lexicon which words are
ordered alphabetically by the first letter (here, the strictness of EPL), and those with the
same first letter are ordered alphabetically by the second letter (the security level), and so
on. The lexicographic preference has no indifference curves, because indifference levels are
single points. It means that a shortage of a high-priority factor cannot be compensated
by any surplus of lower-priority factors. Finally, no lexicographic preference on a plane
can be represented by a utility function, because the number of ‘flights of stairs’ is non-
countable as the number of points in the first axis (Tangian 1991, p. 49–50). To overcome
this representation inconvenience, one can disregard the continuity of the first scale (here, of
the strictness of EPL) and to calibrate it by reducing to several levels as in Figure 3. Such a
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Figure 3: Lexicographic preference of trade unions with no trade-offs
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calibrated lexicographic preference is representable by a utility function, but the calibration
levels should be sufficiently dense, otherwise the utility will be little sensitive to variations
in the EPL.
The interrelation of the neoliberal and trade-unionist definitions can be illustrated with
Figure 1 by superimposing both preferences. The only commonality is the ‘self-evident’
Pareto-preference which stands for bettering one factor with no worsening of others. In
Figure 1, the Pareto-bettering domain for the year 2000 is shown by a green rectangle. The
Pareto-worsening domain with both less strict EPL and lower security is depicted by a red
rectangle.
From the viewpoint of trade unions, there is not much room for a flexicurity policy. In
Figure 1, the corresponding flexicurity trajectory should ascend along the vertical edge of
the Pareto-bettering domain. Deviations towards a lower flexibility (into the domain) are
undesirable for employers, and deviations towards a higher flexibility (out of the domain)
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are undesirable for trade unions.
Chart of trade-unionist flexicurity According to the trade-unionist concept of flexicu-
rity, the focus should be made at improving the employment and social security of flexible
workers without giving up the rights of regular workers. As follows from the previous anal-
ysis, it is not the case, and we could immediately stop here. Nevertheless, let us have a look
what happens at the market of flexible labour forces, abstracting from its interactions with
the market of regular employment; see Figure 4.
The vertical indifference isolines relate to the first-priority component (EPL) in the trade-
unionist lexicographic preference, showing that up-downward changes of security are not
important. Any deviation of policy trajectory to the left is unfavorable for trade unions, and
an upward increment is appreciated if only the horizontal increment is negligible.
There are clear manifestations of flexicurity policies during the control period 1990–
2003. The decisive indicator Strictness of EPL increased in France (29.6 ↗ 39.4%), Italy
(15.9 ↗ 21.0%), Spain (36.0 ↗ 40.9%), Austria (29.3 ↗ 34.0%), Poland (10.0 ↗ 14.3%),
and Belgium (24.2↗ 26.2%); see Tangian (2004b). The general security of flexible employed
has improved in some of these countries as well, like Italy (39.8↗ 45.9%), Belgium (54.7↗
61.0%), France (51.5 ↗ 55.7%), Poland (45.7 ↗ 49.1%), and Austria (45.2 ↗ 47.1%); see
Tangian (2004b). The progress in Poland is especially remarkable, because it occurred within
only four years 2000–2003 of availability of Poland’s statistical data to the EU.
However, in many cases this increase is not due to a better employment and social pro-
tection of flexibly employed. To a great extent it is due to the increasing share of per-
manently part-time employed. More and more young people and women sign part-time
contracts, thereby reducing the share of normal employment (Austria, France, Belgium,
Poland). Another factor is the decreasing share of self-employed since they close their
business and become employees (France, Austria, Belgium). Thereby the share of better
employment/socially protected within flexibly employed increases and their average employ-
ment and social security status grows.
The greatest degression in social utility due to a decrease in the decisive indicator Strict-
ness of EPL (again, we speak exclusively of flexibly employed!) is inherent in Sweden
(42.8 ↘ 31.6%), Denmark (31.0 ↘ 21.9%), Germany (43.1 ↘ 36.9%), Czech Republic
(15.6 ↘ 11.7%), the Netherlands (42.9 ↘ 40.5%), and Portugal (25.4 ↘ 24.9%); see Tan-
gian (2004b). As for compensation of these degradations by security measures, there is no
sense to discuss it as long as the trade-unionist lexicographic utility is considered.
The degressions are also often caused by transitions between employment categories rather
than by institutional changes. In Sweden the share of best-protected permanently part-time
employed decreased 18.3 ↘ 14.1%, and in Denmark 19.5 ↘ 17.3%. In Czech Republic the
share of well-protected permanent part-timers decreased not much (3.1 ↘ 2.3%) but the
share of self-employed, who are not protected by labour laws, increased (10.7↗ 15.3%); see
Tangian (2004b). Thus the average employment status within flexibly employed decreased
and the average employment protection of flexibly employed decreased respectively.
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Figure 4: Flexibility-Security nexus for flexibly employed only (trade-unionist perspective)
in the background of trade unions’ vertical flexicurity isolines of first priority
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The changes in the indices for flexibly employed should not be misinterpreted. A great
deal of changes are caused by transitions between employment categories. The indicators
only reflect changes within flexibly employed, disregarding normally employed. Therefore, an
eye should be kept on the dynamics of employment categories. For instance, if the strictness
of EPL for flexibly employed increases but of all employed decreases then, most likely, the
share of normally employed feeds the share of flexibly employed with a higher employment
status.
In actuality, however, the price of certain advantages for flexibly employed is incomparable
with disadvantages for regularly employed. The latter are so significant that the general aver-
age trend is essentially negative. This disproportion in flexicurity advantages/disadvantages
is unambiguously illustrated in Figure 2 which reflects the factual situation of all workers in
general. This means that relatively few flexibly employed gain little from significant
losses of much more numerous normally employed.
Thus, during the last decade the situation of flexibly employed in certain European coun-
tries has visibly improved. It would be a trade unions’ victory, if the situation improved
ceteris paribus, not having been aggravated by other factors. It is not necessary to emphasize
that a growth in indices of flexibly employed due to transitions from regular employment
does not make trade unions very happy.
Inconsistency between neoliberal and trade-unionist viewpoints at flexicurity
The conception of flexicurity as proposed by neoliberals is shaped to their vision of values. It
suggests a compensation which looks quite fair: one commodity (labour rights) is exchanged
for another commodity (social security), and the only question is the substitution rate which
should be negotiated.
The misleading trick is that on the neoliberals’ playing field, to which they invite, every-
thing can be bought and sold by default (which is not always true!). However, this apparent
natural prerequisite (inherent in usual trade union negotiation practice with no political
requirements) leaves trade unions with no chance to win. The choice is only between bad
and worst. In a sense, it is suggested that workers’ social health (= the right to remain at
work) be exchanged for a treatment (= social care in the form of advanced social security
benefits). In other words, give me your hand, and get a prosthesis instead. However: Can a
prosthesis, whatever its value, substitute a healthy hand?
To have a real chance, trade unions need their own playing field where they are hosts
rather than guests, or at least a neutral one. The key problem is that social preferences
of neoliberals and trade unions are more than just different, they differ in the type of
preference. The former have a hill-shaped utility with gradual ascents/descents in every
direction. Trade-unions have a stair-like utility with gradual ascents/descents only along the
‘flight of stairs’ but with leaps in all other directions. What is suggested as a subject for
‘deliberate’ bargaining— determining the slope of social trade-off—is questionable for trade
unions whose preference has no indifference curves which might have a slope.
It corresponds well to the remark of Wilthagen and Tros’ (2004, p. 169): ‘some recent
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studies are pessimistic that appropriate trade-offs can be found between flexibility and secu-
rity’. Furthermore, they even more specifically point out the problem of the very existence
of trade-offs: ‘If these levels . . . do not exist, negotiations and trade-offs are hard to envisage,
because there is ‘no more/or less’ situation’ (Op.cit, p.181).
7 Three proposals: How to unify values and to balance
forces
Thus, the critical component of flexicurity is the Utility function which incorporates social
values and implies trade-offs. In defining such a function one has to ask questions: Do
higher industrial productivity, higher competitiveness, and other economic criteria constitute
the goal of human development? Why economic performance is put beyond social fairness
and social justice? Is it moral to trade the social health against higher productivity and
consumption? In other words, is it really more important to be economically rich rather
than to be socially healthy?
Flexicurity as trade-off under utility function Labour market performance The
flexicurity trade-offs can be level curves of the function of unemployment rate in variables
‘flexibility’ and ‘security’. Such a function can be empirically estimated by fitting the re-
gression (hyper)plane to European survey data provided flexibility and security factors being
represented by numerical indices. The casual relation ‘flexibility-security→unemployment’
can be considered with a delay of one year. A trade-off with respect to such a function can
convince trade unions, providing a basis for bargaining.
Similarly, flexicurity trade-offs can be determined from the index of macroeconomic per-
formance (weighted sum of indicators of unemployment, GDP growth, inflation, increase in
public debt, and resistance to economic shocks) estimated as a function in five flexibility and
four security variables.
Flexicurity as Social insurance for flexibily employed If the idea of the second
component of flexicurity, Flexibility, is clearly linked to a relaxation of EPL, the idea of the
third flexicurity component, Security, remains quite vague. A solution could be as follows.
Since all types of flexibility are projected on the one-dimensional money-compensation
bargaining axis, the role of social security becomes similar to that of health insurance or
life insurance, which rates depend only on risk and sum of compensation. The employer
contributions to social security (∼ rates) can be double-progressive, depending both on wage
(∼ the insurance compensation) and flexibility of the contract (∼ risk of unemployment).
Flexibly employed can be additionally ‘insured’ similarly to the additional health insurance
for the medical expenses not recognized by the state.
This way the social security system receives contributions, corresponding to the social
risk of insured. The employers are less rigidly constrained then under the employment
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protection legislation. Flexibly employed enjoy equal or even more generous social benefits
than permanently employed (due to the additional insurance for flexibly employed). Finally,
society maintains a consensus by equilibrating the supply and demand for all degrees of
employment flexibility.
Multi-national trade unions opposed to multi-national companies At the political
level, there is a visible disequilibrium of interested sides. National trade unions can hardly
negotiate with multi-national companies which can move jobs to countries with cheap labour
and flexible employment relations. Solidarity and unions of national organizations are not
sufficient. A solution could be multi-national trade unions with the same international status
and operating in the same economic space as multi-national corporations.
8 Conclusions
1. Operational definitions of liberal and trade-unionist concepts of flexicurity
are suggested. They imply dedicated indicators for monitoring and improving flexi-
curity polices with respect to factual rather than juridical situation in the EU member
states.
The indicators are based on statistical data on (a) the size of eight employment groups
in 16 European countries in 1990-2003, (b) scores of the employment protection legis-
lation available from the OECD, and (c) five security rank-based indicators obtained
from juridical data available from the European Commission.
2. (Empirical observations) The first quantitative analysis shows that the practical
implementation of flexicurity is far behind its theory. Minor advantages for flexibly
employed turn into great disadvantages for regularly employed with a negative general
balance.
The concept of flexicurity may not be holding up to its political promises and theoret-
ical declarations.
3. (Practical implications) Operationalizing the notion of flexicurity and keeping it
under instrumental control with empirical feedback can contribute to finding acceptable
political solutions.
A possible flexicurity regulation of labour market in the form of flexicurity insurance
is proposed. Achieving a world-wide social consent requires a parity multi-national
status of corporations and trade unions.
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Annex 1: Rank-based composite indicators
The juridical data on social security in Europe available from the OECD (2002, pp.146–
148) and European Commission (2004) are exclusively qualitative (descriptive). It makes
the OECD (2003) guide-lines for developing composite indicators of country performance
irrelevant. The model described below is based on methods for practically constructing
utility functions (Tangian 2002, 2004a) and, more specifically, on the author’s experience in
designing an indicator of working conditions for European countries from the Third European
Survey of Working Conditions 2000 by European Foundation (2001); see Tangian (2004d).
Why composite indicators are weighted sums of variables A composite indicator
in the general form is a formula with n entries (for first-level indicators), in other words, a
function f in n variables which to each set of input values x1, . . . , xn puts into correspondence
the indicator value y = f(x1, . . . , xn). Usually a composite indicator is not expected to
abruptly change its behavior, meaning the differentiability of f . Then its Taylor expansion
in a neighborhood of some reference point (x01, . . . , x
0
n) gives the first-order approximation
of f :
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Since composite indicators are primarily used for comparisons and tracing relative progress,
the constant C in (1) is omitted. The remaining weighted sum of variables is, consequently,
the general composite indicator to within its first-order approximation.
Apparent problems with rank-based composite indicators The OECD (2003) guide-
lines for constructing composite indicators assume that the input first-level indicators are
metrical (= measured in a cardinal scale). Ordinal first-level indicators (= expressed in
ranks) create certain problems discussed by the OECD (1999, p. 115) in the context of
composite indicator for the strictness of employment protection legislation:
One limitation of a summary indicator based on ranking is that a given country’s
strictness score could either rise or fall over time, even though its employment
protection practice were completely unchanged, for the simple reason that other
countries changed their policies. Even more fundamentally, it would be invalid to
compare rank-based score for the late 1980s, which was based on an analysis of 16
European countries, with a rank-based score for the late 1990s based on a sample
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of 27 countries. Quite independently of any changes in EPL, the maximum rank
score has nearly doubled.
By these reasons the OECD (1999) replaced originally ordinal data by metrical expert
estimates. The method survived (OECD 2004), although the OECD itself acknowledges that
‘the scoring algorithm is somewhat arbitrary’ (OECD 1999, p. 115).
Thus, the first OECD’s concern is that rank-based indicators can make a country’s score
dependent on changes in other countries. It is similar to what occurs in tournaments when
one’s rating is altered by wins/losses of competitors. This phenomenon, known in the theory
of choice as the dependence of irrelevant alternatives, is not always critical; for the historical
discussion see Black (1958, pp. 156–238) and McLean and Urken (1994, Introduction). In
any case, the ranking method can be modified as follows.
Method of Total Ranks To be specific, consider Denmark (DK) and Netherlands (NL)
with regard to the duration of unemployment insurance in 1994–2004. In 1994 the duration
of Danish insurance was 30 months, and in the Netherlands it was 6–54 months, depending
on the length of service and age (Schmid and Reissert 1996, p. 239–241). In 2004 Den-
mark extended the duration unconditionally to 48 months (European Commission 2004).
Although the duration of Dutch insurance remained unchanged, the Netherlands fall in the
two successive rankings:
Rank 1994 2004
Country Insurance duration Country Insurance duration
1 NL 6–54 months, conditioned DK 48 months, unconditioned
2 DK 30 months, unconditioned NL 6–54 months, conditioned
Now rank all the pairs Country/Year. For this purpose consider Denmark in 1994 and
Denmark in 2004 as two different objects (as they actually are) and the Netherlands in 1994
and in 2004 as two copies of the same object. Hence, the total ranking is
Rank Country Year Insurance duration
1 DK 2004 48 months, unconditioned
2 NL 1994 6–54 months, conditioned
2 NL 2004 6–54 months, conditioned
3 DK 1994 30 months, unconditioned
which implies the constant rank of the Netherlands and changing ranks of Denmark:
Rank 1994 2004
Country Insurance duration Country Insurance duration
1 DK 48 months, unconditioned
2 NL 6–54 months, conditioned NL 6–54 months, conditioned
3 DK 30 months, unconditioned
Thus ranks can be made independent of ‘irrelevant alternatives’.
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Accuracy of a rank-based composite indicator The second, ‘more fundamental’,
OECD’s concern is that the first-level indicators based on ranks are invalid when the number
of countries changes (e.g. the top rank of 27 countries almost doubles the top rank of 16
countries). This problem can be resolved by proportionally reducing all the ranks to the
standard scale 0–1. The rigorous normalizing rules as well as the estimation of error from
substituting ordinal ranks for cardinal scores are given below.
Consider ranks as manifestations of continuous evaluations which are not observed di-
rectly. Consequently, if one defines an indicator as a weighted sum of partial scores and
disposes but partial ranks, it is natural to substitute the ranks for the scores.
This idea goes back to the justification of Borda’s (1733–1799) method of marks by
Laplace (1749–1827); for the modern account see Black (1958), Tangian (1991), and McLane
and Urken (1994). Recall that Borda proposed to evaluate candidates to the members of
the Royal Academy of Sciences in Paris by the sum of their ranks in the ballot schedules.
Laplace assumed that these ranks were manifestations of some n latent metrical estimates
(scores) uniformly distributed in the segment [0; 1]. He showed that the ratio of expectations
of the scores was as that of their ranks
µ1 : µ2 : . . . : µn = 1 : 2 : . . . : n .
By the Central Limit Theorem (the first version is attributed to Moivre (1667–1754); see
Kendall and Stuart 1958, Korn and Korn 1968) a sum of a large number of metrical scores
is well approximated by the sum of their expectations, or ranks. Laplace concluded that in
a large statistical model scores could be replaced by ranks with a negligible error.
This way of thought can be implemented already for a few metrical estimates (scores)
under a controllable accuracy of approximation. The next theorem suggests a normalizing
rule for the input ranks (differing from the standardization of metrical input) and estimates
the errors of the composite indicator which result from ‘ordinal rounding’ of its continuous
entries.
Theorem 1 (Accuracy of a rank-based composite indicator)
Let given countries be independently ranked with respect to social security partial criteria
k = 1, . . . , 5, giving Rk ranks for criterion k, that is, Rk is the lowest rank for criterion
k. For each criterion, the ranks are ordinal manifestations of unknown continuous scores
x1, . . . , xRk which are random variables uniformly distributed in the segment [0; 1] (default
statistical assumption). Consider an indicator (a sum of variables with weights ak) both for
continuous scores and ranks:
Icontinuous =
∑
k
akxrk ←→ I
rank−based =
∑
k
ak
rk
Rk + 1
,
∑
k
ak = 1, ak ≥ 0 , (2)
where xrk is the rkth score from the bottom for criterion k. Then the error due to the ‘ordinal
rounding’
∆ = Icontinuous − Irank−based
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has expectation and variance, respectively,
µ = E∆ = 0
σ2 = V∆ =
∑
k
a2k
rk(Rk − rk + 1)
(Rk + 1)2(Rk + 2)
(
≤
1
4
∑
k
a2k
Rk + 2
)
. (3)
Proof. Fix the kth criterion. As shown by Kendall and Moran (1963), the rkth ordered
score xrk is beta-distributed with the expectation and variance
Exrk =
rk
Rk + 1
, Vxrk =
rk(Rk − rk + 1)
(Rk + 1)2(Rk + 2)
.
Hence, taking into account that I is constant regardless of values xrk
µ = E∆ = E I − E I˜ =
∑
k
ak
rk
Rk + 1
−
∑
k
akE xrk = 0 .
By the independence of estimation with respect to different criteria, the variance of the sum
of scores is equal to the sum of their variances. We obtain
σ2 = V∆
= V I + V I˜
V I=0 since I is constant
=⇒
=
∑
k
a2k
rk(Rk − rk + 1)
(Rk + 1)2(Rk + 2)
Identity
=⇒
=
∑
k
a2k
≤0.25︷ ︸︸ ︷
0.25−
(
0.5−
rk
Rk + 1
)2
Rk + 2
.
We conclude:
1. The concern about the difficulties in using ranks in constructing indicators is overem-
phasized.
2. In certain cases (for instance, while tracing country development), the Method of Total
Ranks overcomes the dependence on irrelevant alternatives inherent in common ranks.
3. Rank method can be adapted (a) to compare variable number of options, (b) to allow
several options with the same rank, (c) to optimize statistical properties of rank-based
composite indicators.
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Annex 2: Composite indicator of Social security
Incoming subfactors for the indicator Social security The main function of social
security is to compensate income losses in case of unemployment, illness, etc. We consider
the following five benefits:
1. Unemployment insurance (OECD 2002, p. 144–150)
2. Participation in a public pension scheme (OECD 2002, p. 144–150)
3. Paid sick leave (OECD 2002, p. 144–150)
4. Paid maternity leave (OECD 2002, p. 144–150)
5. Paid holidays (OECD 2002, p. 144–150)2
The eligibility to social security benefits differ for different employment groups, which
should be taken into account. For example, normally employed can be strongly secured and
the atypically employed can be weakly secured. If the first group is large and the second
is small then the social security of the society is quite high. However, if the first group is
small and the second is large then, under the same juridical regulation, the social security
level should be considered low. Therefore, the factual rather than intended social security
in a country should be described by the weighted average Social security of the groups with
the weights being proportional to their size.
Within the flexicurity debate, Klammer and Tillmann (2001, p. 514) and Hoffmann and
Walwei (2000) provide a classification of types of employment with respect to four dichotomic
indicators: (a) permanent/fixed-term, (b) full-time/part-time, (c) employed/self-employed,
and (d) in agriculture/not in agriculture. For self-employed the discrimination between
‘permanent’ and ‘fixed-term’ is not relevant, and from 24 = 16 employment groups it remains
the following eight:
1. Permanently full-time employed
2. Permanently part-time employed
3. Fixed-term full-time employed
4. Fixed-term part-time employed3
2Entitlement to paid holidays is usually not considered within the flexicurity debate. It is not quite
logical. Securities are aimed at compensating income losses and exceptional medical and family burdens,
including vacations. Therefore, no entitlement to paid holidays discriminates those flexibly employed who
work few hours, under short-time contracts, or self-employed, which should be taken into account.
3Fixed-term part-timers with low income are sometimes singled out into the group of Mini-job-holders;
see Keller and Seifert (2004, p. 240). We do not consider mini-jobs here, because they are ill-socially-secured,
not sufficiently reflected in the available statistics, and because it is impossible to consider all minor forms
of employment relations. One has to stop somewhere, not descending to tips for hotel porters. The natural
criterion of significant jobs is the tax liability which cuts mini-jobs off.
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5. Full-time self-employed in agriculture
6. Full-time self-employed not in agriculture
7. Part-time self-employed in agriculture
8. Part-time self-employed not in agriculture.
Thus we obtain 8 employment groups in each of 16 countries, totally 128 groups. The
authors cited consider no labour market outsiders as suggested by Wilthagen and Tros
(2004). Respectively, we do not consider them here, also because flexicurity deals with the
flexibility of employment relations.
Weights of social benefits The five social security benefits are considered with equal
weights ak =
1
5
(as equally important). The equal weights are justified by the following rea-
son. Each individual has his/her own weight ratio for social security benefits. For instance,
a young women with a small child may pay the prime attention to Sick leave, a middle-aged
man to Unemployment insurance, and an older worker to Pensions. Therefore, assigning a
higher weight to Unemployment insurance we favor the middle-aged man and discriminate
both the young woman and the older worker.
Generally speaking, higher weights of certain benefits are advantageous for those who are
most interested in them and disadvantageous for those who are not. Thereby unequal benefit
weights result in a factual inequality of individuals. Therefore, the problem of weighting
social security benefits is closely linked to the one of weighting individuals. Since individual
weights are usually assumed equal (= one voter one vote), regardless of education, experience,
or intelligence, the benefit weights should be assumed equal as well. Any deviation from equal
weights is a source of debate, and to avoid it, equal weights are accepted whenever possible.
In statistics it is also a tradition to accept the equal distribution (weights) by default,
unless no other information is available; such an assumption satisfies the principle of maximal
likelihood; see Kendall and Moran (1963). One can expect that even if in actuality the
weights are unequal, the deviations from equal weights statistically annihilate each other so
that the equally-weighted composite indicator provides a reasonable approximation.
Computation of the indicator Social security Consider the first security benefit Un-
employment insurance (k = 1). Table 3 contains the national rules as given by OECD
(2002, p. 146–148) and updated from European Commission (2004) by Martin Kimmich. In
comparison to Schmid and Reissert (1996, pp. 239–241) Judith Aust found no significant
changes during 1994–2003.
The second section of Table 3 contains ranking of the 128 pairs Group/Country (also
performed by Martin Kimmich). Let us trace the ranking procedure step-by-step. Assign
rank 1 to the best pair(s) Country/Group with respect to the rules listed. Then assign rank
2 to the next-best pair(s) Country/Group, and so on. If certain pairs have been overlooked
then they are inserted between the ones already ranked with an intermediate fractional
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rank like 1.5. These fractional ranks are converted by computer to integer-valued ranks in
parentheses. ‘NAN’ (Not A Number) stands for missed data. As usual in empirical studies,
they are replaced by mean values, in this case by the rounded middle rank. Since there are
12 ranks (the maximal rank R1 is given in the table caption), the NaN is replaced by 7.
Other benefits Pensions, Sick leave, Maternity leave, and Paid holidays (k = 2, . . . , 5)
are processed in the same way with similar Tables 4–7. Thereby, each Country/Group
(m,n) is evaluated with respect to benefit k, getting rank 1 ≤ rmnk ≤ Rk, where Rk is the
maximal rank attained with respect the kth benefit. To respect the rule ‘the more the better’
invert ranks rmnk to Rk + 1 − rmnk. The ranks are normalized to the range 0–1 by taking
Rk+1−rmnk
Rk+1
= 1 − rmnk
Rk+1
. The resulting equidistant grades which provide the most accurate
statistical approximation (see Annex 1).
The score of Social security Imn of every Country/Group (m,n) is computed by the Annex
formula (2) with equal weights ak =
1
5
. The social security level Imt in a countrym in year t is
the weighted mean of that of its employment groups with the weights bmnt being proportional
to their size in the given year:
Imn =
1
5
·
5∑
k=1
(
1−
rmnk
Rk + 1
)
Imt =
8∑
n=1
bmntImn . (4)
The computation results for Germany (m = 1) in 1990–2003 are shown in Table 8 coupled
with Figure 5.
For example, the group of permanently full-time employed (n = 1) in Germany (m =
1 = DE) has partial ranks with respect to the five partial criteria rDE1 k = 5, 4, 1, 1, 4.
The maximal ranks are Rk = 12, 9, 15, 8, 7. Substitute these values into (4), apply the
transformation 1− I, and obtain the summary score
1− IDE1 =
1
5
·
(
1−
5
13︸ ︷︷ ︸
=61.5%
+1−
4
10︸ ︷︷ ︸
=60.0%
+1−
1
16︸ ︷︷ ︸
93.8%
+1−
1
8︸ ︷︷ ︸
=88.9%
+1−
4
8︸ ︷︷ ︸
=50.0%
)
= 0.708︸ ︷︷ ︸
=70.8%
which is shown in the bottom-left section of Table 8. The composition of summary scores
from partial scores for the sample year 2003 is displayed in the bottom section of Table 8.
The top number of each cell is the size of the employment group n in year t, given in %
to total employment in the given year (= the weight bmnt). In Figure 5 it is the length of
the corresponding color rectangle. The bottom number of the cell is the Security level Imn
for the group shown by the color rectangle’s height. The horizontal color layers show the
contribution of five benefits as given in the bottom section of Table 8. The black background
is the Security deficit, that is, the remainder to attain the 100%-security.
The German yearly security levels Imt are shown in the next to last column of Table 8.
In Figure 5 it is the share of colored area in the framing rectangle of the year. For instance,
the level of security in Germany in 2003 is obtained from the 2003 row of Table 8:
SDE2003 = 0.619 · 0.708 + 0.175 · 0.688 + · · ·+ 0.012 · 0.175 = 0.647 = 64.7%.
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General conditions Employment type
Statutory
right
Conditions Permanent
full-time
Permanent
part-time
Fixed-term
full-time
Fixed-term
part-time
Full-time
self-em-
ployed in
agriculture
Full-time
self-em-
ployed not in
agriculture
Part-time
self-em-
ployed in
agriculture
Part-time
self-em-
ployed not in
agriculture
Germany yes 12 months in
last 3 years
or 6 months
if a seasonal
worker
2(5) 2(5) 2.5(6) 2.5(6) 6(12) 6(12) 6(12) 6(12)
Austria yes 52 weeks in
past 24
months and
earnings >
309 EUR
2(5) 2.5(6) 3(8) 3(8) 6(12) 2(5) 6(12) 2.5(6)
Belgium yes 312 days in
past 18
months for
< 36 years
old and
more days
for older age
groups
3(8) 4(10) 3(8) 4(10) 6(12) 6(12) 6(12) 6(12)
Switzerland yes 6 months in
past 2 years;
12 months
for repeat
claim
1.5(3) 1.5(3) 1.75(4) 1.75(4) NaN(7) NaN(7) NaN(7) NaN(7)
Czech Republic yes 12 months in
past 3 years
2(5) 2(5) 2.75(7) 2.75(7) NaN(7) NaN(7) NaN(7) NaN(7)
Danemark volontary
participation
52 weeks in
past 3 years;
34 weeks for
part-timers
2(5) 2(5) 2.75(7) 2.75(7) 2.5(6) 2.5(6) 2.5(6) 2.5(6)
Spain yes 360 days in
past 6 years
2(5) 2(5) 2.5(6) 2.5(6) 6(12) 6(12) 6(12) 6(12)
Finland yes 43 weeks in
past 24
months and
> 18 hours
per week
1.75(4) 4(10) 2(5) 4(10) 1.75(4) 1.75(4) 4(10) 4(10)
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u
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)
General conditions Employment type
Statutory
right
Conditions Permanent
full-time
Permanent
part-time
Fixed-term
full-time
Fixed-term
part-time
Full-time
self-em-
ployed in
agriculture
Full-time
self-em-
ployed not in
agriculture
Part-time
self-em-
ployed in
agriculture
Part-time
self-em-
ployed not in
agriculture
France yes 4 months in
past 18
months
1(1) 1(1) 1.25(2) 1.25(2) 6(12) 6(12) 6(12) 6(12)
Italy yes 52 weeks in
past 2 years
2(5) 2(5) 3(8) 3(8) 6(12) 6(12) 6(12) 6(12)
Netherlands yes 26 weeks in
last
39 weeks
1.5(3) 1.5(3) 1.75(4) 1.75(4) 6(12) 6(12) 6(12) 6(12)
Norway yes income past
year
> 125% of
basis; or
mean
income past
3 years >
100% of
basis
2.5(6) 3(8) 2.5(6) 3(8) 6(12) 6(12) 6(12) 6(12)
Poland yes, if
earnings >
minimum
wage
365 days in
past 18
months
2(5) 3.5(9) 3(8) 3.5(9) NaN(7) NaN(7) NaN(7) NaN(7)
Portugal yes 540 days in
past 24
months
3.5(9) 4.5(11) 4.5(11) 4.5(11) 6(12) 6(12) 6(12) 6(12)
Sweden yes 6 months in
past 12
months
1.5(3) 1.5(3) 1.5(3) 1.5(3) 2.5(6) 2.5(6) 2.5(6) 2.5(6)
United Kingdom yes some
employment
in past 2
years and
contri-
butions paid
> some
multiple of
threshold
3(8) 3.5(9) 3(8) 3.5(9) 6(12) 6(12) 6(12) 6(12)
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Table 4: Ranking (1–9) groups of employees with respect to social security benefit Pension.
Source: own estimation based on OECD (2002), p. 146–148 and MISSOC (2004)
General conditions Employment type
Statu-
tory
right
Employ-
ment
duration
Perma-
nent
full-time
Perm-
anent
part-
time
Fixed-
term
full-time
Fixed-
term
part-
time
Full-
time
self-em-
ployed
in agri-
culture
Full-
time
self-em-
ployed
not in
agricul-
ture
Part-
time
self-em-
ployed
in agri-
culture
Part-
time
self-em-
ployed
not in
agricul-
ture
Germany yes > 325
EUR
and 60
months
2.5(4) 3(5) 3.5(6) 3.5(6) 3(5) 2.5(4) 4.5(8) 3(5)
Austria yes 180-300
months
with
earnings
> 309
EUR
3(5) 3.5(6) 3(5) 3.5(6) 3(5) 3(5) 3.5(6) 3.5(6)
Belgium yes all 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1.5(2) 1.5(2) 1.5(2) 1.5(2)
Switzerland yes 1 year 2(3) 2(3) 2.5(4) 2.5(4) NaN(5) NaN(5) NaN(5) NaN(5)
Czech Republic yes not ap-
plicable
NaN(5) NaN(5) NaN(5) NaN(5) NaN(5) NaN(5) NaN(5) NaN(5)
Danemark yes all 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1)
Spain yes 15 years 3(5) 3(5) 4(7) 4(7) 3(5) 3(5) 3(5) 3(5)
Finland yes a month
and
mini-
mum
earnings
1(1) 2(3) 1(1) 2(3) 1.5(2) 1.5(2) 2(3) 2(3)
France yes all 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 2(3) 2(3) 2(3) 2(3)
Italy yes 5 years 2.5(4) 3(5) 3.5(6) 3.5(6) 2.5(4) 2.5(4) 3(5) 3(5)
Netherlands yes all 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1)
Norway yes all 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1)
Poland yes it varies NaN(5) NaN(5) NaN(5) NaN(5) NaN(5) NaN(5) NaN(5) NaN(5)
Portugal yes 15 years
with
>120
days
3(5) 5(9) 4(7) 5(9) 3(5) 3(5) 5(9) 5(9)
Sweden yes all 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1)
United Kingdom yes earnings
>
thresh-
old
2(3) 2.5(4) 2(3) 2.5(4) 2(3) 2(3) 2.5(4) 2.5(4)
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Table 5: Ranking (1–15) groups of employees with respect to social security benefit Sick
leave. Source: own estimation based on OECD (2002), p. 146–148 and MISSOC (2004)
General conditions Employment type
Statu-
tory
right
Employ-
ment
duration
Perma-
nent
full-time
Perm-
anent
part-
time
Fixed-
term
full-time
Fixed-
term
part-
time
Full-
time
self-em-
ployed
in agri-
culture
Full-
time
self-em-
ployed
not in
agricul-
ture
Part-
time
self-em-
ployed
in agri-
culture
Part-
time
self-em-
ployed
not in
agricul-
ture
Germany yes all 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 6(15) 6(15) 6(15) 6(15)
Austria yes (not
for
on-call
workers)
monthly
earnings
> 309
EUR
1.5(2) 3.5(9) 1.5(2) 3.5(9) 6(15) 3.5(9) 6(15) 3.5(9)
Belgium yes 3
months
2(4) 2(4) 2.5(5) 2.5(5) 3.5(9) 3.5(9) 3.5(9) 3.5(9)
Switzerland volun-
tary
partici-
pation
3
months
2(4) 2(4) 2.5(5) 2.5(5) NaN(8) NaN(8) NaN(8) NaN(8)
Czech Republic no not ap-
plicable
6(15) 6(15) 6(15) 6(15) NaN(8) NaN(8) NaN(8) NaN(8)
Danemark yes > 72
hours in
past 8
weeks
1(1) 3.5(9) 1(1) 3.5(9) 3.75(10) 3.75(10) 3.75(10) 3.75(10)
Spain yes 180 days
in past
5 years
4(11) 4.5(13) 5(14) 5(14) 4(11) 4(11) 4.5(13) 4.5(13)
Finland yes all 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1)
France yes 800
hours in
past 12
months
3(7) 4(11) 3.5(9) 4(11) 6(15) 5(14) 6(15) 5(14)
Italy yes all 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 6(15) 6(15) 6(15) 6(15)
Netherlands yes all 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 6(15) 6(15) 6(15) 6(15)
Norway yes 14 days 1.5(2) 1.5(2) 1.5(2) 1.5(2) 2(4) 2(4) 2(4) 2(4)
Poland yes 30 days 1.75(3) 1.75(3) 1.75(3) 1.75(3) NaN(8) NaN(8) NaN(8) NaN(8)
Portugal yes 6
months
3.5(9) 3.5(9) 3.75(10) 3.75(10) 4(11) 4(11) 4.25(12) 4.25(12)
Sweden yes all 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1.5(2) 1.5(2) 1.5(2) 1.5(2)
United Kingdom yes 3
months
and
earnings
> 500
EUR
2.5(5) 4(11) 2.75(6) 4(11) 3(7) 3(7) 3.25(8) 3.25(8)
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General conditions Employment type
Statutory
right
Contribu-
tion
period
Beyond
contract
Permanent
full-time
Permanent
part-time
Fixed-term
full-time
Fixed-term
part-time
Full-time
self-em-
ployed in
agriculture
Full-time
self-em-
ployed not
in
agriculture
Part-time
self-em-
ployed in
agriculture
Part-time
self-em-
ployed not
in
agriculture
Germany yes all yes 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 6(8) 6(8) 6(8) 6(8)
Austria yes monthly
earnings >
309 EUR
yes 1(1) 3(4) 1(1) 3(4) 5.5(7) 3(4) 5.5(7) 3(4)
Belgium yes all yes (at
benefit
level)
1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 3(4) 3(4) 3(4) 3(4)
Switzerland yes all yes 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) NaN(5) NaN(5) NaN(5) NaN(5)
Czech Republic no not
applicable
yes 6(8) 6(8) 6(8) 6(8) NaN(5) NaN(5) NaN(5) NaN(5)
Danemark yes > 120
hours in
past 13
weeks
yes 1.5(2) 3(4) 1.5(2) 3(4) 1.5(2) 1.5(2) 1.5(2) 1.5(2)
Spain yes 180 days in
past 5 years
no 3(4) 3.5(5) 3.5(5) 3.5(5) 3(4) 3(4) 3.5(5) 3.5(5)
Finland yes all yes (by the
state)
1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1)
France yes 200 hours
per quarter
in past 6
months or
800 hours
in past year
yes 1.75(3) 3(4) 3(4) 3(4) 1(1) NaN(5) 1(1) NaN(5)
Italy yes all no 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1.5(2) 1.5(2) 1.5(2) 1.5(2)
Netherlands yes all no 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1)
Norway yes all yes 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1)
Poland yes 6 months no 3(4) 3(4) 3.5(5) 3.5(5) NaN(5) NaN(5) NaN(5) NaN(5)
Portugal yes 6 months yes 3(4) 3(4) 3.5(5) 3.5(5) 6(8) 6(8) 6(8) 6(8)
Sweden yes all yes 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1)
United Kingdom yes 26 weeks
and
earnings
> 500 EUR
yes 3(4) 4(6) 3.5(5) 4(6) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1)
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Table 7: Ranking (1–7) groups of employees with respect to social security benefit Paid
holidays. Source: own estimation based on OECD (2002), p. 146–148 and MISSOC (2004)
General conditions Employment type
Statu-
tory
right
Contri-
bution
period
Perma-
nent
full-time
Perm-
anent
part-
time
Fixed-
term
full-time
Fixed-
term
part-
time
Full-
time
self-em-
ployed
in agri-
culture
Full-
time
self-em-
ployed
not in
agricul-
ture
Part-
time
self-em-
ployed
in agri-
culture
Part-
time
self-em-
ployed
not in
agricul-
ture
Germany yes 6
months
3(4) 3(4) 3(4) 3(4) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7)
Austria yes 6
months
3(4) 3(4) 3(4) 3(4) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7)
Belgium yes all 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7)
Switzerland yes pro rata 2(3) 3(4) 2(3) 3(4) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7)
Czech Republic yes NaN(4) NaN(4) NaN(4) NaN(4) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7)
Danemark yes all 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7)
Spain yes NaN(4) NaN(4) NaN(4) NaN(4) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7)
Finland yes > 14
days or
> 35
hours
per
months
1.5(2) 1.5(2) 1.5(2) 1.5(2) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7)
France yes 1 month 2(3) 2(3) 2(3) 2(3) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7)
Italy yes all 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7)
Netherlands yes all 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7)
Norway yes all 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7)
Poland yes all 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7)
Portugal yes 30 days 2(3) 2(3) 2(3) 2(3) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7)
Sweden yes all 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7)
United Kingdom yes
(not for
all
sectors)
13 weeks
(cur-
rently
under
consid-
eration
to
remove
this
restric-
tion)
4(5) 4(5) 4(5) 4(5) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7) 6(7)
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Table 8: Employment types in Germany and their evaluation with respect to criterion Se-
curity (Source: EuroStat and own estimation)
Year Employment group, in % to total employment / Security
Its summary score with respect to criterion Security, in % (weighted average
Normal Flexible employment of summary scores)
Perma-
nent
full-time
Perm-
anent
part-
time
Fixed-
term
full-time
Fixed-
term
part-
time
Full-
time
self-em-
ployed
in agri-
culture
Full-
time
self-em-
ployed
not in
agricul-
ture
Part-
time
self-em-
ployed
in agri-
culture
Part-
time
self-em-
ployed
not in
agricul-
ture
For all
em-
ployed
(liberal
concept)
For
flexibly
em-
ployed
(trade-
unionist
concept)
% % % % % % % % % %
1990
69.3
70.8
11.8
68.8
8.1
65.3
1.4
65.3
1.3
17.5
7.0
19.5
0.1
11.5
0.9
17.5 65.2 52.6
1991
71.1
70.8
11.2
68.8
8.0
65.3
1.2
65.3
1.0
17.5
6.6
19.5
0.1
11.5
0.8
17.5 65.7 53.1
1992
69.9
70.8
11.7
68.8
8.5
65.3
1.1
65.3
1.0
17.5
6.9
19.5
0.1
11.5
0.8
17.5 65.5 53.0
1993
69.2
70.8
12.2
68.8
8.2
65.3
1.2
65.3
1.0
17.5
7.2
19.5
0.1
11.5
0.9
17.5 65.3 52.9
1994
68.4
70.8
12.7
68.8
7.8
65.3
1.5
65.3
1.0
17.5
7.6
19.5
0.1
11.5
0.9
17.5 65.1 52.8
1995
67.8
70.8
13.2
68.8
7.9
65.3
1.5
65.3
0.9
17.5
7.6
19.5
0.1
11.5
1.0
17.5 65.1 53.0
1996
66.5
70.8
13.6
68.8
8.8
65.3
1.3
65.3
0.9
17.5
7.9
19.5
0.1
11.5
1.0
17.5 64.9 53.2
1997
65.0
70.8
14.3
68.8
9.2
65.3
1.4
65.3
0.9
17.5
8.1
19.5
0.1
11.5
1.1
17.5 64.7 53.4
1998
63.8
70.8
15.0
68.8
9.5
65.3
1.5
65.3
0.8
17.5
8.0
19.5
0.1
11.5
1.2
17.5 64.7 53.8
1999
62.6
70.8
15.5
68.8
10.1
65.3
1.7
65.3
0.9
17.5
8.1
19.5
0.1
11.5
1.2
17.5 64.6 54.2
2000
62.3
70.8
16.0
68.8
9.8
65.3
1.7
65.3
0.8
17.5
8.2
19.5
0.1
11.5
1.2
17.5 64.6 54.2
2001
61.9
70.8
16.8
68.8
9.4
65.3
1.7
65.3
0.8
17.5
8.1
19.5
0.1
11.5
1.2
17.5 64.6 54.6
2002
61.8
70.8
17.3
68.8
9.0
65.3
1.8
65.3
0.8
17.5
8.1
19.5
0.1
11.5
1.2
17.5 64.6 54.6
2003
61.9
70.8
17.5
68.8
8.8
65.3
1.8
65.3
0.8
17.5
7.9
19.5
0.1
11.5
1.2
17.5 64.7 54.8
Construction of summary score Security from partial scores for 2003, in % Criterion weight
Unempl.insur. 61.5 61.5 53.8 53.8 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 0.2
Pension 60.0 50.0 40.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 20.0 50.0 0.2
Sick leave 93.8 93.8 93.8 93.8 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 0.2
Matern.leave 88.9 88.9 88.9 88.9 11.1 11.1 11.1 11.1 0.2
Paid holidays 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 0.2
Weighted sum 70.8 68.8 65.3 65.3 17.5 19.5 11.5 17.5 1.0
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Figure 5: Employment types in Germany and their evaluation with respect to criterion
Security (Source: EuroStat and own estimation)
1990 69
Pe
rm
an
en
t f
ul
l−
tim
e
Normal employment
12
Pe
rm
an
en
t p
ar
t−
tim
e
Flexible employment
8
Fi
xe
d−
te
rm
 fu
ll−
tim
e
1
Fi
xe
d−
te
rm
 p
ar
t−
tim
e
1
Fu
ll−
tim
e 
se
lf−
em
pl
oy
ed
 in
 a
gr
ic
ul
tu
re
7
Fu
ll−
tim
e 
se
lf−
em
pl
oy
ed
 n
ot
 in
 a
gr
ic
ul
tu
re
0
Pa
rt−
tim
e 
se
lf−
em
pl
oy
ed
 in
 a
gr
ic
ul
tu
re
1
Pa
rt−
tim
e 
se
lf−
em
pl
oy
ed
 n
ot
 in
 a
gr
ic
ul
tu
re
1991 71
11
8
1
1
7
0
1
1992 70
12
8
1
1
7
0
1
1993 69
12
8
1
1
7
0
1
1994 68
13
8
2
1
8
0
1
1995 68
13
8
2
1
8
0
1
1996 67
14
9
1
1
8
0
1
1997 65
14
9
1
1
8
0
1
1998 64
15
10
1
1
8
0
1
1999 63
16
10
2
1
8
0
1
2000 62
16
10
2
1
8
0
1
2001 62
17
9
2
1
8
0
1
2002 62
17
9
2
1
8
0
1
2003 62
17
9
2
1
8
0
1
Size of employment groups, in % to total employment
Ev
al
ua
tio
n 
w
ith
 re
sp
ec
t t
o 
cr
ite
rio
n 
 S
ec
ur
ity
,
 
in
 c
on
di
tio
na
l %
1990 1995 2000 2005
52
54
56
58
60
62
64
66
68
70
72
Year
Ev
al
ua
tio
n 
w
ith
 re
sp
ec
t t
o 
cr
ite
rio
n 
 S
ec
ur
ity
,
 
 
in
 c
on
di
tio
na
l %
DE
DE
DE
Norm.employed
All employed
Flex.employed
43
For a specific trade-unionist concept of flexicurity to be considered later, the last column of
Table 8 contains a similar index but for flexibly employed only:
Fmt =
1∑8
n=2 bmnt
·
8∑
n=2
bmntImn .
For Germany in 2003 it is obtained from the 2003 row of Table 8 as follows:
S
flex
DE2003 =
SDE2003 − 0.619 · 0.708
1− 0.619
= 0.548 = 54.8%.
In Figure 5 it corresponds to the share of colored area in the reduced framing rectangle of
the year with no first (permanent full-time) section.
The auxiliary graph in Figure 5 visualizes the Security yearly dynamics for normally, for
all, and for flexibly employed (the first and two last columns of Table 8).
Accuracy of the composite indicator Social security Estimate total errors σmt of
the Security indicator for country m in year t.
• Assume the independence of rankings with respect to social security benefits k. For
every country m and employment group n obtain the summary error from (3):
σmn =
1
5
√√√√ 5∑
k=1
rmnk(Rk − rmnk + 1)
(Rk + 1)2(Rk + 2)
, (5)
where
1
5
are equal weights of five social security benefits,
rmnk is the integer-valued rank of employment group n in country m with respect to
security benefit k, as given in Table 3, and
Rk is the maximal rank for benefit k.
• Since ranks of employment groups with respect to the same social security benefit k are
dependent random variables, the standard error of the Security indicator of a country
m in a given year t cannot be found from the sum of variances: σmt 6=
√∑8
n=1 b
2
mntσ
2
mn .
We use a less advantageous formula which includes correlation, namely the weighted
sum of standard errors with weights being the relative size of employment groups bmnt:
σmt =


8∑
n=1
bmntσmn (for all employed: liberal concept)
1∑8
k=2 bmnt
·
8∑
n=2
bmntσmn (for flexibly employed: trade-unionist concept) .
(6)
The yearly total errors for country’s Security indicator computed for all employed (=
liberal concept) and for flexibly employed only (= trade-unionist concept) are shown
in Tables 9–10. The last column of the tables provides the maximal total indicator
error during the control period 1990–2003. Substitute summary errors (5) into (6) and
obtain the errors for Security indicators of pairs Country/year.
44
Table 9: Total standard error σmt in estimating Security for all employed (liberal concept)
σmt in % (liberal concept) maxt σmt
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 %
Germany 5.56 5.57 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.56 5.55 5.55 5.55 5.55 5.55 5.55 5.55 5.55 5.57
Austria 5.85 5.86 5.86 5.87 5.88 5.88 5.89 5.90 5.91 5.91
Belgium 4.89 4.88 4.88 4.88 4.88 4.88 4.88 4.88 4.88 4.86 4.86 4.86 4.89
Switzerland 5.71 5.72 5.71 5.72 5.72 5.72 5.72 5.72 5.72
Czech Republic 5.73 5.74 5.74 5.74 5.74 5.74 5.75 5.75
Danemark 5.02 5.02 5.01 5.02 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.01 5.01 5.00 5.00 4.99 4.99 5.00 5.02
Spain 6.20 6.20 6.19 6.19 6.19 6.19 6.19 6.20 6.21 6.22 6.23 6.23 6.23 6.24 6.24
Finland 4.82 4.82 4.82 4.83 4.83 4.83 4.83 4.83 4.83 4.83
France 5.46 5.47 5.47 5.47 5.48 5.48 5.48 5.48 5.49 5.49 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.49 5.50
Italy 5.02 5.02 5.02 5.02 5.02 5.02 5.02 5.02 5.02 5.02 5.02 5.03 5.03 5.03 5.03
Netherlands 4.27 4.28 4.28 4.28 4.28 4.28 4.28 4.28 4.28 4.28 4.29 4.28 4.28 4.28 4.29
Norway 4.62 4.63 4.63 4.63 4.63 4.63 4.63 4.63 4.63 4.63
Poland 5.90 5.90 5.90 5.89 5.90
Portugal 5.96 5.95 6.00 6.00 5.98 5.97 5.95 5.94 5.94 5.95 5.96 5.94 5.93 5.93 6.00
Sweden 4.35 4.35 4.35 4.34 4.34 4.34 4.34 4.34 4.34 4.35
United Kingdom6.11 6.12 6.12 6.12 6.12 6.12 6.12 6.12 6.13 6.13 6.14 6.14 6.14 6.13 6.14
Table 10: Total standard error σmt in estimating Security for flexibly employed only (trade-
unionist concept)
σmt in % (trade-unionist concept) maxt σmt
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 %
Germany 5.35 5.36 5.36 5.35 5.35 5.35 5.36 5.36 5.37 5.38 5.38 5.39 5.39 5.39 5.39
Austria 6.03 6.02 6.04 6.05 6.07 6.09 6.09 6.13 6.14 6.14
Belgium 5.05 5.03 5.02 5.02 5.02 5.01 5.00 4.99 4.98 4.94 4.94 4.93 5.05
Switzerland 5.84 5.83 5.83 5.83 5.83 5.83 5.82 5.83 5.84
Czech Republic 5.90 5.92 5.92 5.92 5.93 5.93 5.93 5.93
Danemark 5.34 5.33 5.33 5.33 5.32 5.32 5.33 5.33 5.34 5.33 5.34 5.35 5.35 5.35 5.35
Spain 5.89 5.91 5.91 5.90 5.91 5.92 5.92 5.93 5.93 5.94 5.95 5.95 5.96 5.96 5.96
Finland 4.87 4.87 4.87 4.88 4.89 4.89 4.89 4.89 4.90 4.90
France 5.35 5.36 5.36 5.39 5.39 5.41 5.42 5.43 5.44 5.45 5.47 5.47 5.46 5.44 5.47
Italy 4.93 4.93 4.94 4.93 4.94 4.94 4.94 4.94 4.94 4.95 4.95 4.95 4.96 4.95 4.96
Netherlands 4.23 4.24 4.25 4.24 4.24 4.24 4.25 4.25 4.26 4.26 4.27 4.26 4.27 4.27 4.27
Norway 4.56 4.57 4.57 4.57 4.57 4.57 4.57 4.57 4.57 4.57
Poland 6.00 5.98 5.97 5.96 6.00
Portugal 5.33 5.28 5.23 5.21 5.18 5.19 5.18 5.19 5.27 5.28 5.32 5.28 5.31 5.30 5.33
Sweden 4.41 4.41 4.41 4.41 4.40 4.41 4.41 4.41 4.40 4.41
United Kingdom5.75 5.77 5.79 5.80 5.80 5.81 5.82 5.83 5.84 5.85 5.86 5.86 5.85 5.84 5.86
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Annex 3: Composite indicator of the Strictness of EPL
As already mentioned, we represent the Flexibility by the Strictness of EPL. OECD (1999,
pp.52–53 and 2004, pp. 61–125) designed two indicators for permanently and temporary
employed; see Table 11. To obtain yearly summary indicators of Strictness of EPL for a
Table 11: Summary indicators of the strictness of employment protection legislation. Source:
own estimation based on OECD (1999) pp. 52–53, 66
Permanent employment Fixed-term employment Collective dismissals
Late 1980s Late 1990s Late 1980s Late 1990s Late 1990s
Score 0–6 Score 0–6 Score 0–6 Score 0–6 Score 0–6
Germany 2.7 2.8 3.8 2.3 3.1
Austria 2.6 2.6 1.8 1.8 3.3
Belgium 1.5 1.5 4.6 2.8 4.1
Switzerland 1.2 1.2 0.9 0.9 3.9
Czech Republic 2.8 2.8 0.5 0.5 4.3
Danemark 1.6 1.6 2.6 0.9 3.1
Spain 3.9 2.6 3.5 3.5 3.1
Finland 2.7 2.1 1.9 1.9 2.4
France 2.3 2.3 3.1 3.6 2.1
Italy 2.8 2.8 5.4 3.8 4.1
Netherlands 3.1 3.1 2.4 1.2 2.8
Norway 2.4 2.4 3.5 2.8 2.8
Poland 2.2 2.2 1.0 1.0 3.9
Portugal 4.8 4.3 3.4 3.0 3.6
Sweden 2.8 2.8 4.1 1.6 4.5
United Kingdom 0.8 0.8 0.3 0.3 2.9
country do the following
• extrapolate the scores of a country’s employment group (permanent/temporary) from
1989 and 1999 (‘late 1980s’ and ‘late 1990s’) to 1990–2003 by linear regression
• compute the yearly Strictness of EPL for permanently, temporary, and self-employed
with a constant score of Collective dismissals (available only for 1999) and weights 5
6
, 1
6
suggested by the OECD (1999, p. 118):
Strictness of EPL =


5
6
· Score of permanently employed + 1
6
· Collective dismissals
for permanently employed
5
6
· Score of temporary employed + 1
6
· Collective dismissals
for temporary employed
0 for self-employed
• taking the weighted sum of the EPL indicators of three employment groups (perma-
nently, temporarily, and self-employed) with the weights proportional to their size in
the given year (to reflect the factual rather than intended situation, similarly as in the
indicator of Social security).
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